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CaseNo.20110292-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATEOFUTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
DAVID Q. POULSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an order of restitution from convictions for
participating in a pyramid scheme, class B misdemeanors, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6a-4 (West Supp. 2011). This Court has jurisdiction under
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).1
INTRODUCTION

The trial court correctly ordered Defendant to pay restitution after
Defendant pleaded guilty to participating in a pyramid scheme. Defendant
admitted in his plea that he solicited $168,400 from the two victims, and he
acknowledges on appeal that the victims lost that sum. Unrebutted record
evidence supports those facts. These facts establish a causal nexus between
1

Citation throughout this brief is to the current code, applicable at the
time of events at issue in this case.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant's criminal conduct and the victims's losses because the offense
Defendant pleaded guilty to uniquely provides an offender's victims with civil
causes of action to regain their lost consideration. Restitution for those losses is
appropriate because Utah prohibits and criminalizes even mere participation in
a pyramid scheme, when the defendant—as here —receives compensation for
introducing another into the scheme.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court properly order Defendant to pay restitution of
$60,000 where Defendant admitted soliciting $168,000 from victims and the
offense of participating in a pyramid scheme provides civil remedies for the
victim's losses?
Standard of Review. "[An appellate court] will not disturb a trial court's
order of restitution unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law
or abuses its discretion." State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, | 5, 217 P.3d 274
(brackets in original) (quoting State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, If 6,170 P.3d
1141).

STATUTES
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A:

2
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§§ 13-11-4, -19 (West 2010);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6a-l-4, -6 (West 2004 and West Supp. 2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-38a-102, -301, -302 (West 2004 and West
Supp. 2011).

UTAH CODE ANN.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Defendant was charged with two counts of securities fraud and one count
of unlicensed broker-dealer. R2-1. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of
participating in a pyramid scheme in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-4
(West Supp. 2011), class B misdemeanors. R7-5; R78:4-6 (Amended Information
and Judgment attached at Addendum B). As a factual basis for the plea,
Defendant, through counsel, admitted that on or about "March 14th of 2008 and
September 26th, 2008, [he] solicited funds for a pyramid scheme, the total
amount was ... $168,400." R78:5 (Transcript of plea hearing attached at
Addendum C). The court sentenced Defendant to two 180-day jail terms,
suspended the sentences, fined Defendant, and placed him on probation for
twelvemonths. R6-5.
The State moved for an order requesting Defendant pay restitution to two
named victim in the amount of $168,400. R17-16 ("motion"). The motion was
supported by two promissory notes. In one of the notes, dated March 11,2008,
Defendant ("borrower"), promised to pay Robert Clark ("lender"), "$100,000
together with interest at the rate of three (3%) per month on the unpaid
3
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principal balance from $100,000 until paid in full one year later unless
renewed/' R13. The other note, dated September 23,2008, was identical to the
first, except that the lender was Michael Keith, the unpaid principal balance was
$90,000, and interest to be paid was "forty-eight (48%) per annum/7 R9-8. Each
note was signed by Defendant and the respective victim/lender. R12,8. Also
attached to the motion was a summary of these two investments, setting out
interest payments paid to each victim/lender—$18,000 to Clark and $3,600 to
Keith-totaling a "loss for restitution" for Clark of $82,00, and for Keith of
$86,400, for a combined total of $186,400 and photocopies of Clark's check, made
to "Q & B Capital, LLC of David Poulsen." R14,13. (Motion and supporting
documents attached at Addendum D.)
In response, Defendant moved to dismiss the hearing on substantially the
same grounds he argues on appeal—lack of a factual foundation or a causal
nexus to show the victims, losses stemmed from his acts. R31-24, 51-41. The
State opposed Defendant's motion, arguing that (1) restitution was appropriate
because the victims could recover their losses in a civil action under a variety of
legal theories and (2) Defendant was responsible for the victims, losses because
he admitted and pleaded guilty to introducing the victims into the pyramid
scheme. R40-33, at 37-35. The State also noted that unbeknownst to Clark and
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Keith, Defendant was to receive 10% interest per month on their investments
and that in fact, Defendant received $42,000 from Clark's and Keith's
investments. R39. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the
restitution for the reasons urged by the State. R55.
At the restitution hearing, the State drew the court's attention to its
request for restitution, including the State's summary of victim's losses, totaling
$168,400 ($82,000 to Clark and $86,000 to Keith) and the other documents in
support. R79:3-4. (Transcript of restitution hearing attached at Addendum E).
Defendant stipulated that "the dollar figures that you see there are the amounts
that victims put into this." Id. at 4. But Defendant then attempted to re-argue
the previously denied motion not to impose restitution:
Defense Counsel: I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus between
the allegations pled to, which is participating in a pyramid scheme,
and the restitution in this case. And I don't believe that 168
represents a nexus in any way, shape or form to, to the injury The Judge: That's the argument you made to me that I denied
though, isn't it?
Defense Counsel: I'm not sure if that's, if that's what the basis of
your denial was, Your Honor. I'm not sure
The Judge: That was the basis - Defense Counsel: - - if that's what you said.
The Judge: -- of your case though, wasn't it?
5
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Defense Counsel: My request was to dismiss the hearing.
The Judge: Yes.
Defense Counsel: I think the court can still have a hearing but still
make a decision as to the appropriateness of the relationship
between the a . . .
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at the
hands of this person. There's no facts in the record to support that,
Your Honor. Any facts would be hearsay to that effect.
We pled very simply to participating in a pyramid scheme. I
asked the court in all earnest that the restitution order be tied to
only those facts. Otherwise we would not have pled to them, Your
Honor.
I would say further, had we known that we were going to be
facing $168,000 restitution I would rather take, try the case and
have the offense, you know, dealt with in a full and fair hearing
that plead to participating in a pyramid scheme and still face a
$168,000 payback.
The Judge: Well, if he had been found guilty you would still be
faced with the same consequence. They would be asking for
restitution for this amount.
Defense Counsel: They would be, and then, and again
The Judge: We would be right here today whether you pled guilty
or found guilty.
Defense Counsel: But we'd probably only do it to a pyramid
scheme, Your Honor. That's different than sticking somebody up
for [$]168,000. They are not the same. And there's no a nexus
between those two, it's very very crucial.

6
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Id. at 5-6 (capital letters in original; brackets added).
The court acknowledged Defendant's argument, but declined to accept it.
Id. at 7. The court reminded Defendant that he had earlier stipulated to the
amount of $168,000 as "the amount the victims had put into the scheme, but
neverthless invited counsel to present evidence "as to what the amount ought to
be." Id. at 7. Defense counsel replied that even though Defendant was making
$100,000 per year, he would soon be facing the expense of sending one of his six
children on a Church mission and another to college and had other expenses
related to a "growing" family. Id. at 7-9.
The State responded that based on documents Defendant filed two years
earlier in seeking bankruptcy, his income exceed his expenses by $1,000 per
month. Id. at 9. Thereafter the following exchanges took place:
The Judge: Okay. So let's make sure that you're both a [sic],
representing to me the standard of review for the court here today.
You both stipulate and agree that the real purpose of the hearing
today is to determine not the amount of restitution, that's been
fixed and is full and complete at [$]168,400. Right? But the order
should be based on his ability to pay. Correct?
Prosecutor: Yes, Your Honor.
The Judge: Do you agree with that?
Defense Counsel: I do agree with that.

7
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The Judge: And what you've presented to me is the only evidence
that I have before me to determine his ability to pay. Correct?
Defense Counsel: Yes. As well as appropriateness. If I could state
for the record, as well as the appropriateness of the payment in the
nexus to the crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to
• follow.

"" "•'

****<

•

The Judge: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing that to me and
I'm not sure I understand it. Because that was before me before
and I, I think I denied that, that argument that you have made that
there should be a restitution that, no restitution in this case because
it's not appropriate to the crime he committed.
Defense Counsel: And the only thing again I would like to say for
the record on that point, it's appropriate to have a restitution
hearing where both the amount of restitution, or both the ability to
pay as well as the circumstances of the restitution are appropriate.
I think that that is within the scope of a restitution hearing.
The Judge: Ms. Baldwin do you have, O'Bryant do you have
anything to respond to that?
Prosecutor: Your Honor, I think the court has ruled on whether
restitution is appropriate in the case. It's just simply the amount
that needs to be addressed here today.
Id. at 10-11.
Defendant suggested that he could pay and it would be reasonable to
impose "a $10,000 obligation over a period ... of three years." Id. at 8. The court
ordered that Defendant pay $30,000 in restitution to each of the victims, Clark
and Keith, at the rate of $500 per month to each victim, that is, $60,000 total paid
at a rate of $12,000 per year. Id. at 12. See also signed Minutes of Restitution

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-* '

- ^

Hearing, R57-56 (attached at Addendum F). The court based its order largely on
the documented evidence that Defendant had $1,000 in monthly disposable
income after expenses. Id. at 9,12-13
"'

r

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R60. Thereafter, Defendant

moved the trial court to stay judgment, including the restitution order, until this
Court decided his appeal. R70-62. The trial court denied the stay, noting that
the victims would be prejudiced by any further delay in receiving restitution.
R77-76. Defendant then moved for a stay in this Court. This Court denied the
stay, noting that Defendant had failed to show that he would be irreparably
harmed by paying restitution during the pendency of the appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that in ordering restitution, the trial court did not rely
on the facts admitted to in the plea hearing, but rather made impermissible
inferences as to his conduct and its nexus to the victims7 losses. Contrary to this
argument, Defendant's guilty plea, his admissions, and the undisputed facts
justify the court's restitution order.
Defendant pleaded guilty to participating in a pyramid scheme and
admitted that he solicited funds from both victims in the total amount of
$168,400. And record evidence, as well as the very existence of the proceedings

9
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in this case, support that the victims never recovered their money. The court
made no inferences beyond these facts, nor did it need to, to justify its
restitution award of $30,000 to each victim because the Pyramid Scheme Act sets
out statutory remedies when it is violated, which in turn establish pecuniary
damages, justifying the court's restitution award.
Contrary to Defendant's further argument, restitution need not have been
based on a showing of "some species of common law fraud." Utah, like other
states, have recognized that pyramid schemes are against public policy and are
inherently deceptive because the lower ranks of those participating are
necessarily harmed.
Finally, Defendant was not denied due process. Contrary to Defendant's
claim, the trial court gave reasons for awarding restitution, and Defendant
received all the hearing that he was entitled to.

10
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING THAT DEFEND ANT PAY RESTITUTION WHERE
DEFENDANT ADMITTED SOLICITING FUNDS FROM
VICTIMS AND THE OFFENSE OF PARTICIPATING IN A
PYRAMID SCHEME PROVIDES CIVIL REMEDIES FOR THE
• VICTIM'S LOSSES
Defendant argues that "[i]n entering the restitution order, the trial court
did not rely upon what was admitted to in the plea hearing, but rather made
impermissible inferences as to the conduct of the defendant... in relation to the
victims, and in establishing a causal link to the putative damages." Aplt. Br. at
4, 4-17. Defendant further argues that he "was ordered to make restitution
without basic due process considerations in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution" because he was not allowed a
hearing on the appropriateness of the restitution award. Id. at 4, 17-21.
Defendant's arguments fail because his guilty plea, record evidence, and
statutorily-provided causes of action associated with participation in a pyramid
scheme support the restitution order; he was given an adequate hearing; and
alternatively, any denial of a hearing was invited or harmless under the
circumstances.

11
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A. The record facts and Defendant's guilty plea to participating in a
pyramid scheme established a sufficient factual basis for ordering
restitution.
A pyramid scheme "means any sales device or plan under which a person
gives consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right
to receive compensation which is derived primarily from the introduction of
other persons into the sales device or plan ...." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-2(4)
(West Supp. 2011). "Any person who participates in a pyramid scheme only by
receiving compensation for the introduction of other persons into the pyramid
scheme ... is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-4(2)
(West Supp. 2011).
Defendant pleaded guilty to two reduced counts of participating in a
pyramid scheme, in violation of section 76-6a-4(2), class B misdemeanors. R7-5;
R78:5-6. As a factual basis for the pleas, Defendant admitted that on or about
"March 14th of 2008 and September 26th, 2008, [he] solicited funds for a
pyramid scheme, the total amount was ... $168,400." R78:5 (Transcript of plea
hearing attached at Addendum C). The State requested restitution of $168,400
to compensate the victims, Clark and Keith, and supported its request with an
accounting of the victims' losses, Defendant's and the victims' signed
promissory notes, and a photocopy of Clark's check to Defendant. R17-8
(Addendum D). At the restitution hearing, the State drew the court's attention
12
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to its previous request for restitution, including its summary of victim's losses —
set off by any interest the victims7 received —a loss of $82,000 to Clark and
$86,400 to Keith, and its supporting documents.

R79:3-4. (Transcript of

restitution hearing attached at Addendum E). Defendant stipulated that the
State's accounting accurately reflected "the amounts that victims put into this";
that is, the combined amount of $168,400 was what the victims lost. R78:4.
Indeed, Defendant admits on appeal, that the victims lost, in total, the amounts
he stipulated to. See RAplt. Br. at 9,15.
In sum, Defendant admitted to participating in a pyramid scheme; the
documents in support of the State's request for restitution establish that the
victims joined the pyramid by giving Defendant their $186,400; and Defendant
admits that the victims lost a total of $168,400 in the pyramid scheme. Those are
the facts, and contrary to Defendant's argument, the trial court made no
inferences beyond those facts necessary to support its determination of complete
restitution ($168,400) or court-ordered restitution ($60,000).
B. The offense of participating in a pyramid scheme uniquely
provides a causal nexus between the criminal conduct and a
victim's losses.
"When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in
13
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this chapter...." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(l) (West Supp. 2011) (emphasis
added). See State v. haycock, 2009 UT 53 \ 18, 214 P.3d 104) ("[Restitution is
mandated by statute and is a part of a criminal sanction imposed by the state/7).
"'Restitution7 means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim[.]77 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(ll) (West 2004).
"'Pecuniary damages7 means all demonstrable economic injury, ... which a
person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes ... losses... ,77 UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77~38a-102(6) (West 2004).
Utah has adopted a modified "but for77 test to determine whether
pecuniary damages actually arise out of criminal activities. See State v. McBride,
940 P.2d 539,544 (Utah Ct.App.1997). A modified "but for77 test requires that (1)
the damages "'would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying the ...
[defendant's] conviction777 and (2) the "'causal nexus between the [criminal]
conduct and the loss ... is not too attenuated (either factually or temporally).777 Id.
at 544 n.5 (citation omitted and brackets added).
Beneath Defendant's argument that the court made improper inferences
from the facts lies his more essential claim: "there is no direct causal nexus
between admitting to participating in [acts involving a pyramid scheme], and

14
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third-parties actually losing large sums of money/' Aplt. Br. at 12. To illustrate
his point, Defendant argues that actors who promoted, as opposed to merely
participated in, a pyramid scheme, "presumably ... by some species of common
law fraud/' would be the appropriate subjects of a restitution award. Aplt. Br.
at 13-15. Nor, he argues, does there exist any "but for"connection between his
criminal acts and the victims' losses. Aplt. Br. at 15-16. But the statutory
framework providing for the offense of participating in a pyramid scheme
expressly rebuts Defendant's argument.
Chapter 6a of Title 76 sets out the "Pyramid Scheme Act." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-6a-l (West 2004). The Pyramid Scheme Act expressly provides a
remedy for victims of an offender's receipt of money to participate in a pyramid
scheme: "Any person giving consideration in connection with a pyramid
scheme may ... declare his giving of consideration and the related sale or
contract for sale void, and may bring a court action to recover the consideration/'
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-6(l) (West 2004) (emphasis added). See Peterson v. Tlw
Sumider Coiy., 2002 UT 43, ^ 39 n.14, 48 P.3d 918 (recognizing in contract
dispute embracing a putative pyramid scheme remedy provided by section 766a-6(l)).

15
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Additionally, a guilty plea under the Pyramid Scheme Act to participating
in a pyramid scheme automatically subjects a defendant to liability under the
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") as a matter of law: "A criminal
conviction under this chapter is prima facie evidence of a violation of Section 1311-4, the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act[,]" and further, "[a]ny violation of
this chapter constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act/7 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-3(2), -(3) (West Supp. 2011).
As a result of Defendant's statutory violation of section 13-11-4, his
victims were entitled to bring an action for their losses under the UCSPA.
Section 13-11-19 of the UCSPA provides that a "consumer who suffers loss as a
result of a violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a class action, actual
damages or $2,000, whichever is greater, plus court costs." UTAH CODE ANN. §
13-11-19(2) (West 2010).
As noted, section 77-38a-102(6) provides for recovery of pecuniary
damages stemming from "facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal
activities/' "'Criminal activities' means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court ...." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(2)
(West 2004). The "general rule applicable in criminal proceedings is that by
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pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential
elements of the crime charged ..." State v. Harris, 2011 UT App 274, % 2, 262
P.3d 1209 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989)).
"w

In short, Defendant's guilty plea to participating in a pyramid scheme, his

admission that he solicited at least $168,400 from the victims, and thie
undisputed evidence that the victims lost that amount, justified the court's
ruling that complete restitution should be set at $168,400. And based on thie
undisputed evidence of Defendant's ability to pay, the court properly ordered
restitution in the amount of $60,000.
Contrary to Defendant's argument, that only those committing "some
species of common law fraud" should be subject to a restitution order, the
Pyramid Scheme Act, in conjunction with the UCSPA, deems pyramid schemes
to be inherently deceptive.
In Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., the Utah Supreme Court considered
whether a contract providing for a multi-level marketing plan was
unenforceable because it violated the Pyramid Scheme Act. 2002 UT 43, ^ff 2841, 48 P.3d 918. Reflecting on the purpose of the Act, the court stated, "[t]he
plain language of the Act identifies a particular problem: marketing plans in
which commissions are paid based primarily upon recruitment rather than on
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sales of products. Id at ^ 32 (citation omitted).

"Such plans/' the court

continued, "are widely considered to be against public policy inasmuch as they
tend to reward only the top-level participants, encourage participants to buy
more products than they need or can sell, and leave lower-level participants in a
saturated market, unable to recoup their initial investment or achieve the
economic success promised by promoters/7 Id. (citations omitted).
In People ex rel Fahner v. Walsh, 461 N.E.2d 78 (111. Ct. App. 1984), the
Illinois court made express what the Sunrider court implied. Walsh involved the
multi-level marketing of lists of names at a cost of $1,000 to each subsequent
participant. Id. at 80-81. The remaining defendant in the case was convicted of
violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and
ordered to pay restitution on the amount he received from only a limited class of
participants. Id. On appeal by the State, the Illinois Court of Appeals first
opined on the nature of such schemes: "Pyramid programs, such as the [one in
this case], which induce a person to participate on the representation that he or
she cannot only regain the purchase price, but also reap profits by selling the
plan to others, are inherently deceptive and contrary to public policy/' Id. at 82 (citations

omitted) (emphasis added). The appellate then modified the restitution order to
include all purchasers of an interest in the pyramid scheme traceable one sold by
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the defendant and who thereby lost money due to their participation in the plan.
Id. at 84-85. See also State ex re. Celebrezze v. Howard, 602 N.E.2d 665, 671 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1991) (holding defendant's participation in pyramid scheme violated
state consumer sales practices act and stating that"scheme is deceptive in itself
which is why the legislature enacted the law").
In pleading guilty to participating in a pyramid scheme, Defendant
admitted that he solicited "consideration" in "exchange for [the victims']
compensation or the right to receive compensation which is derived primarily
from the introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan." UTAH
CODE ANN. 76-6a-2(4). The criminal activity Defendant admitted constitutes
precisely the type of plan found in violation of public policy in Sunrider,
recognized as per se deceptive in Fahner and Celebrezze, and unambiguously
prohibited by the Pyramid Scheme Act. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6a-3(l) (West
Supp. 2011) ("A person may not-participatein, organize, establish, promote, or
administer any pyramid scheme") (emphasis added). Finally, the "but for" test is
satisfied by Defendant's admission in the plea hearing and the firmly
established facts of the case: If Defendant had not solicited the victims for their
consideration, they would not have lost $168,400.
In sum, the trial court properly ordered Defendant to pay restitution.
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C

Defendant was not denied due process where the trial court gave
reasons for its restitution order and gave Defendant the hearing
he was entitled to.
Defendant argues that the trial court violated due process when it ordered

him to pay restitution without identifying the reasons for its decision and
without affording him a hearing to explain why he should not be held
financially responsible to "injured third parties/' Aplt. Br. at 17-20. Contrary to
this argument, the trial court did identified its reasons for ordering restitution,
and Defendant arguably waived his statutory right to any further hearing. In
any case, any error was harmless because Defendant's admissions justified
restitution and additional testimony could not have altered that decision.
The trial court identified its reasons for ordering restitution when it
denied Defendant's motion opposing the State's request for a restitution
hearing: "For the reasons set forth by the State, and for good cause appearing,
the motion to dismiss the restitution hearing is hereby denied." R55. As noted,
the State opposed Defendant's motion to dismiss for a number of legal reasons.
Among those reasons were that (1) restitution was appropriate because the
victims could recover their losses in a civil action under a variety of legal
theories and (2) Defendant was responsible for the victims' losses because he
admitted and pleaded guilty to introducing the victims into the pyramid
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scheme. R40-33, at 37-35. At the restitution hearing, the court repeatedly
referred to its reasons for denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the hearing:
Defense Counsel: I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus between
the allegations pled to, which is participating in a pyramid scheme,
t n d the restitution in this case. And I don't believe that 168
represents a nexus in any way, shape or form to, to the injury The Judge: That's the argument you made to me that I denied
though, isn't it?
Defense Counsel: I'm not sure if that's, if that's what the basis of
your denial was, Your Honor. I'm not sure
The Judge: That was the basis
Defense Counsel: - - if that's what you said.
The Judge: - - of your case though, wasn't it?
Defense Counsel: My request was to dismiss the hearing.
The Judge: Yes.
R79:5-6. Later, the following colloquy took place when the parties addressed the
propriety of court-order restitution:
The Judge: And what you've presented to me is the only evidence
that I have before me to determine his ability to pay. Correct?
Defense Counsel: Yes. As well as appropriateness. If I could state
for the record, as well as the appropriateness of the payment in the
nexus to the crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to
follow.
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The Judge: I'm not quite sure. You keep arguing that to me and
I'm not sure I understand it. Because that was before me before
and I, I think I denied that, that argument that you have made that
there should be a restitution that, no restitution in this case because
it's not appropriate to the crime he committed.
Defense Counsel: And the only thing again I would like to say for
the record on that point, it's appropriate to have a restitution
hearing where both the amount of restitution, or both the ability to
pay as well as the circumstances of the restitution are appropriate.
I think that that is within the scope of a restitution hearing.
The Judge: Ms. Baldwin do you have, O'Bryant do you have
anything to respond to that?
Prosecutor: Your Honor, I think the court has ruled on whether
restitution is appropriate in the case. It's just simply the amount
that needs to be addressed here today.
W.atlO-11.
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In short, the trial court addressed the reasons for finding restitution
appropriate by rejecting the arguments Defendant made throughout the
proceedings opposing restitution.
As for Defendant's claim that he "was denied even a cursory hearing/7 in
spite of his objection to any hearing, see Aplt. Br. at 17-20, Defendant invited any
error in the court's refusal to take evidence on the issue. See State v. Geukgeuzian,
2004 UT 16, 1f 9, 86 P.3d 742 (stating that invited error doctrine arises from
principle that "'a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial
when that party led the trial court into committing the error'") (quoting State v.
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah 1996)).

The State acknowledges that on appeal its argument justifying
restitution is based on additional civil grounds than those proposed or adopted
below. See Aple. Br. at LB. However, it is well settled that an appellate court
may affirm a judgment "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true
even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by
appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on
by the lower court." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, \ 10, 52 P.3d 1158. Here, the
underlying facts — Defendant's guilty plea and factual statement in support, and
undisputed facts establishing the victims' losses — are apparent on the record.
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Here, Defendant actively opposed the State's request for a restitution
hearing. R31-23,51-41. And while the State requested that the "court... grant
the victims a restitution hearing/7 see R39, plainly, had the victim testified,
Defendant would have been afforded the same opportunity.

Moreover,

Defendant never asked to testify at the restitution hearing and never presented
any evidence — despite the court's invitation to show why the stipulated losses
were incorrect. Instead, Defendant simply reargued his legal argument which
had previously been denied. Under these circumstances, Defendant did not put
the court on notice that an evidentiary hearing was necessary.
In any case, Defendant was allowed to substantially argue that restitution
was not appropriate. He argued that there was no nexus between his guilty plea
and restitution, that he had never conceded that the victims' losses were
attributable to his actions or supported by record facts, that the circumstances
did not justify restitution, and that restitution was inappropriate. R79:5-6,10-11.
Finally, Defendant never produced any facts that would overcome the record
facts justifying restitution.
In sum, Defendant received all the due process he was entitled to and any
error was invited and/or harmless.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted t h i ^ ^ a a y of February, 2012.
- *• MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTC

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-4
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
llChapter 11. Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (Refs & Annos)
•*"§ 13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction violates
this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if
the supplier knowingly or intentionally:
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval, performance
characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it has not;
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality,
grade, style, or model, if it is not;
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has
been used to an extent that is materially different from the fact;
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the consumer for a reason
that does not exist, including any of the following reasons falsely used in an advertisement:
(i) "going out of business";
(ii) "bankruptcy sale";
(iii) "lost our lease";
(iv) "building coming down";
(v) "forced out of business";
(vi) "final days";
(vii) "liquidation sale";
(viii) "fire sale";
(ix) "quitting business"; or
(x) an expression similar to any of the expressions in Subsections (2)(d)(i) through (ix);
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in accordance with a
previous representation, if it has not;
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in greater quantity than
the supplier intends;
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, If it is not;
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not;
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(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation the supplier does not
have;
(j)(i) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer
of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if the
representation is false; or
(ii) fails to honor a warranty or a particular warranty term;
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an inducement
for entering into a consumer transaction in return for giving the supplier the names of
prospective consumers or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer
transactions, if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event occurring after the consumer
enters into the transaction;
(I) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods or furnish the services
within the time advertised or otherwise represented or, if no specific time is advertised or
represented, fails to ship the goods or furnish the services within 30 days, unless within the
applicable time period the supplier provides the buyer with the option to:
(i) cancel the sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the supplier if
the refund is mailed or delivered to the buyer within 10 business days after the day on which the
seller receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's intent to cancel the sales
agreement and receive the refund; or
(ii) extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed by the supplier;
(m) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), fails to furnish a notice meeting the requirements
of Subsection (3)(a) of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct solicitation sale within three
business days of the time of purchase if:
(i) the sale is made other than at the supplier's established place of business pursuant to the
supplier's personal contact, whether through mail, electronic mail, facsimile transmission,
telephone, or any other form of direct solicitation; and
(ii) the sale price exceeds $25;
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as defined under Title 76,
Chapter 6a, Pyramid Scheme Act;
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed In response to a charitable solicitation will be
donated or used for a particular purpose or will be donated to or used by a particular
organization, if the representation is false;
(p) if a consumer indicates the consumer's intention of making a claim for a motor vehicle repair
against the consumer's motor vehicle insurance policy:
(i) commences the repair without first giving the consumer oral and written notice of:
(A) the total estimated cost of the repair; and
(B) the total dollar amount the consumer is responsible to pay for the repair, which dollar
amount may not exceed the applicable deductible or other copay arrangement in the consumer's
insurance policy; or
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(ii) requests or collects from a consumer an amount that exceeds the dollar amount a consumer
was initially told the consumer was responsible to pay as an insurance deductible or other copay
arrangement for a motor vehicle repair under Subsection (2)(p)(i), even if that amount is less
than the full amount the motor vehicle insurance policy requires the insured to pay as a
deductible or other copay arrangement, unless:
(A) the consumer's insurance company denies that coverage exists for the repair, in which case,
the full amount of the repair may be charged and collected from the consumer; or
(B) the consumer misstates, before the repair is commenced, the amount of money the
insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other copay arrangement, in
which case, the supplier may charge and collect from the consumer an amount that does not
exceed the amount the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other
copay arrangement;
(q) includes in any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a consumer transaction,
or any addendum to any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a consumer
transaction, any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of the rights to which a consumer
is entitled under this chapter;
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not previously been agreed to by the
consumer;
(s) solicits or enters into a consumer transaction with a person who lacks the mental ability to
comprehend the nature and consequences of:
(i) the consumer transaction; or
(ii) the person's ability to benefit from the consumer transaction;
(t) solicits for the sale of a product or service by providing a consumer with an unsolicited check
or negotiable instrument the presentment or negotiation of which obligates the consumer to
purchase a product or service, unless the supplier is:
(i) a depository institution under Section 7-1-103:
(ii) an affiliate of a depository institution; or
(iii) an entity regulated under Title 7, Financial Institutions Act;
(u) sends an unsolicited mailing to a person that appears to be a billing, statement, or request
for payment for a product or service the person has not ordered or used, or that implies that the
mailing requests payment for an ongoing product or service the person has not received or
requested;
(v) issues a gift certificate, instrument, or other record in exchange for payment to provide the
bearer, upon presentation, goods or services in a specified amount without printing in a readable
manner on the gift certificate, instrument, packaging, or record any expiration date or
information concerning a fee to be charged and deducted from the balance of the gift certificate,
instrument, or other record; or
(w) misrepresents the geographical origin or location of the supplier's business in connection
with the sale of cut flowers, flower arrangements, or floral products.
(3)(a) The notice required by Subsection (2)(m) shall:
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(i) be a conspicuous statement written in dark bold with at least 12 point type on the first page
of the purchase documentation; and
(ii) read as follows: "YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO
MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY (or time period reflecting the supplier's cancellation
policy but not less than three business days) AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION OR
RECEIPT OF THE PRODUCT, WHICHEVER IS LATER".
(b) A supplier is exempt from the requirements of Subsection (2)(m) if the supplier's cancellation
policy:
(i) is communicated to the buyer; and
(ii) offers greater rights to the buyer than Subsection (2)(m).
(4)(a) A gift certificate, instrument, or other record that does not print an expiration date in
accordance with Subsection (2)(v) does not expire.
(b) A gift certificate, instrument, or other record that does not include printed information
concerning a fee to be charged and deducted from the balance of the gift certificate, instrument,
or other record is not subject to the charging and deduction of the fee.
(c) Subsections (2)(v) and (4)(b) do not apply to a gift certificate, instrument, or other record
useable at multiple, unaffiliated sellers of goods or services if an expiration date is printed on the
gift certificate, instrument, or other record.
Laws 1973, c. 188, § 4; Laws 1983, c. 55, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 58, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 250, § 1;
Laws 1987, c. 105, § 3; Laws 1995, c. 237, S 1, eff. May 1, 1995: Laws 1998, c. 194, 6 1, eff.
May 4, 1998: Laws 1999, c. 21, S 8, eff. May 3, 1999: Laws 2001, c. 196, § 1, eff. April 30,
2001: Laws 2004, c. 55, 5 2, eff. March 15, 2004: Laws 2005, c. 18, S 2, eff. March 8, 2005:
Laws 2005, c. 27, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005: Laws 2006, c. 115, S 1, eff. May 1, 2006: Laws 2007, c.
19, 5 1, eff. April 30, 2007: Laws 2008, c. 232, S 1, eff. May 5. 2008: Laws 2010, c. 54, S 1, eff.
May 11, 2010.
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-11-19
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
"HChapter 11. Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act fRefs & Annos^
+§ 13-11-19. Actions by consumer
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an adequate remedy at law, a
consumer may bring an action to:
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this chapter; and
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has violated, is violating,
or is likely to violate this chapter.
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may recover, but not in
a class action, actual damages or $2,000, whichever is greater, plus court costs.
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(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover damages or has an adequate remedy at
law, he may bring a class action for declaratory judgment, an injunction, and appropriate
ancillary relief against an act or practice that violates this chapter.
(4)(a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may bring a class
action for the actual damages caused by an act or practice specified as violating this chapter by a
rule adopted by the enforcing authority under Subsection 13-11-8(2) before the consumer
transactions on which the action is based, or declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a
final judgment of the appropriate court or courts of general jurisdiction and appellate courts of
this state that was either officially reported or made available for public dissemination under
Subsection 13-ll-7(l)(c) by the enforcing authority 10 days before the consumer transactions
on which the action is based, or with respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited
specifically by the terms of a consent judgment which became final before the consumer
transactions on which the action is based.
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a supplier and the damages
can be computed with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on behalf of consumers who
cannot be located with due diligence shall be transferred to the state treasurer pursuant to Title
67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act.
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of this chapter
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid the error, recovery under this section is limited to the amount, if any, in which
the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation.
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may award to the
prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work reasonably performed if:
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this chapter has brought or
maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a supplier has committed an act or practice
that violates this chapter; and
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or required by the court to
be settled under Subsection 13-ll-21(l)(a).
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is taken, a final judgment in favor of
the enforcing authority under Section 13-11-17 is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts
on which it is based in later proceedings under this section against the same person or a person
in privity with him.
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the prevailing party shall mail a copy to
the enforcing authority for inclusion in the pubiic file maintained under Subsection 13-117(l)(e).
(8) An action under this section shall be brought within two years after occurrence of a violation
of this chapter, or within one year after the termination of proceedings by the enforcing authority
with respect to a violation of this chapter, whichever is later. When a supplier sues a consumer,
he may assert as a counterclaim any claim under this chapter arising out of the transaction on
which suit is brought.
Laws 1973, c. 188, § 19; Laws 1983, c. 58, § 9; Laws 1993, c. 4, 5 56; Laws 1995, c. 198, 5 3,
eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 2010, c. 378, 5 200, eff. May 11, 2010.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2010, c. 378, in subsec. (8), substituted "shall" for "must".
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-l
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
"llChapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act
* § 76-6a-l. Short title
This act FFN11 shall be known and may be cited as the "Pyramid Scheme Act."
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-2
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*1§Chapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act
••§ 76-6a-2. Definitions

As used in this chapter:
(l)(a) "Compensation" means money, money bonuses, overrides, prizes, or other real or
personal property, tangible or intangible.
(b) "Compensation" does not include payment based on the sale of goods or services to anyone
purchasing the goods or services for actual personal use or consumption.
(2) "Consideration" does not include payment for sales demonstration equipment and materials
furnished at cost for use in making sales and not for resale, or time or effort spent in selling or
recruiting activities.
(3) "Person" includes a business trust, estate, trust, joint venture, or any other legal or
commercial entity.
(4) "Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a person gives consideration
to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive compensation which is
derived primarily from the introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan rather than
from the sale of goods, services, or other property.
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1; Laws 2006, c. 247, 5 1, eff. May 1. 2006.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-3
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
llChapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act
* § 76-6a-3. Schemes prohibited—Violation as deceptive consumer sales practiceProsecution of civil violations
(1) A person may not participate in, organize, establish, promote, or administer any pyramid
scheme.
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(2) A criminal conviction under this chapter is prima facie evidence of a violation of Section 1311-4, the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
(3) Any violation of this chapter constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah Consumer
Sales Practices Act.
(4) All civil violations of this chapter shall be investigated and prosecuted as prescribed by the
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1; Laws 2006, c. 247, S 2, eff. Mav 1, 2006.
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-4
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
llChapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act
""•§ 76-6a-4. Operation as felony—Participation as
Prosecution

misdemeanor—Investigation-

(1) Any person who knowingly organizes, establishes, promotes, or administers a pyramid
scheme is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Any person who participates in a pyramid scheme only by receiving compensation for the
introduction of other persons into the pyramid scheme rather than from the sale of goods,
services, or other property is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(3) The appropriate county attorney or district attorney has primary responsibility for
investigating and prosecuting criminal violations of this chapter.
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 38, § 79: Laws 2006, c. 247, 5 3, eff. Mav 1. 2006.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6a-6
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
llChapter 6A. Pyramid Scheme Act
••§ 76-6a-6. Rights of persons giving consideration in scheme
(1) Any person giving consideration in connection with a pyramid scheme may, notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary, declare his giving of consideration and the related sale or
contract for sale void, and may bring a court action to recover the consideration. In the action,
the court shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, require the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff interest as provided in Section 15-1-4, reasonable attorneys' fees, and the costs
of the action reduced by any compensation paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in connection
with the pyramid scheme.
(2) The rights, remedies, and penalties provided in this chapter are independent of and
supplemental to each other and to any other right, remedy or penalty available in law or equity.
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to diminish or abrogate any other right,
remedy or penalty.
Laws 1983, c. 89, § 1.

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-102
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
llChapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
"UPart 1. General Provisions
•»§ 77~38a-I02. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Conviction" includes a:
(a) judgment of guilt;
(b) a plea of guilty; or
(c) a plea of no contest.
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition that a
defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the victim, or
fulfill some other condition.
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution.
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(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred,
which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the
defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed,
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but
excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering.
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant will
enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time,
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that
he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution
and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and defendant
including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement by which
the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without
a plea.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,
including prejudgment interest/the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured
damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental
entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law.
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money:
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an offender; and
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that the
person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter.
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative
action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or
cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages
as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001: Laws 2003, c. 278, 5 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws
2005, c. 96, 5 3, eff. May 2, 2005.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38A-301
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
^iChapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
*HPart 3. Restitution Requirements
*•§ 77-38a-301. Restitution—Convicted defendant may be required to pay
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 7, eff. April 30, 2001.

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
"HChapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
"UPart 3. Restitution Requirements
••§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in
Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses
caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution'' means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders
the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one
year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the
court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court
shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant
agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
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(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court
shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of
property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to
physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury
to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of or
damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential
to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a
victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions
to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of
payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate.
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete restitution
and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of sentencing if
feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year after
sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an order of
judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution.
Laws 2001, c. 137, 5 8, eff. April 30, 2001: Laws 2002, c. 35, 5 13, eff. May 6, 2002: Laws
2002, c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002: Laws 2003, c. 285, 5 1, eff. May 5, 2003: Laws 2005, c.
96, 5 5, eff. May 2, 2005.
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FILED

MAY 1 1 W
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN #7041
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 851-8026
Fax:(801)851-8051

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

AMENDED
INFORMATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID Q. POULSEN
aka:
683 South 40 East
Salem UT 84653
DOB: 12/16/1969,

Case No. 101401180
Judge Steven L. Hansen
OTN

Defendant.
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the defendant(s) of the
following crime(s):
COUNT 1: PYRAMID SCHEMES, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-4,
in that the above named defendant, on or about 03/14/2008, in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly
receive compensation for introducing others into a pyramid scheme.
COUNT 2: PYRAMID SCHEMES, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-4,
in that the above named defendant, on or about 09/26/2008, in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly
receive compensation for introducing others into a pyramid scheme.

This Information is based on evidence provided by Richard Hales, Utah County Attorney Investigations.

UTftfi COUNTY ATTORNEY
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
Kfoyl0,2010
MARIANE O'BRYANT
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2
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PLAINTIFF,

5
6
7

INITIAL APPEARANCE
PLEA

STATE OF UTAH,

VS,

CASE
APPEAL

DAVID Q. POULSEN,

101401180
20110292

8

DEFENDANT.

JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN

9
10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on May 11, 2010.
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

15
16
17

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

18

(From Electronic Recording)

19
20
21

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

22
23

ORIGINAL

24
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25

PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER
LIC. 102811-7801
EMAIL:
abbpe@yahoo.com
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FOR THE STATE:
MARIANE B. O1BRYANT, ESQ.
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
100 EAST CENTER #2100
PROVO UT 84606

4
5
6
FOR DEFENSE:
7
8
9

MARK L. POULSEN, ESQ.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 SO. STATE
SANDY UT 84070
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
(May 11, 2010).
MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Number 37, Your Honor?

Okay.

MS. O1BRYANT:
THE JUDGE:

If I may approach, Your Honor.
You may.

MS. OfBRYANT:

We have an amended information.

Counsel has already been provided a copy.
THE JUDGE:
the information.

Okay.

You've been given a copy of

Do you waive a formal reading of the

charge?
MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Yes we do, Your Honor.

We're here today for an initial

appearance and we'll go ahead and schedule his waiver
hearing.

Is that what we are here for?
MR. MARK POULSEN:
MS. OfBRYANT:

I think we're here to plea.

Enter a plea to the amended

information.
MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:
Class B misdemeanors.

Enter a plea today?
I see.

MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Enter a plea, Your Honor.
Okay.

Two

All right.
Yes, Your Honor.

We—

You've advised your client of his

rights?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

I have.
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THE JUDGE:

And he understands the possible

consequences of his plea, the rights that he's giving up or
waiving, the possible sentence that could be imposed?

Is

that right, sir?
DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

THE JUDGE:

Do you understand?

Have you had an

adequate opportunity to talk to your lawyer about those
things?
DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

THE JUDGE:

Are you prepared to waive your rights

and enter a guilty plea to two Class B misdemeanors today?
Is that the plea bargain or not?
MS. O'BRYANT:
THE JUDGE:

Yes, Your Honor.

That is the plea bargain?

MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Yes, Your Honor.

May I have A factual basis to support

the pleas?
MS. 0fBRYANT:

Yes, Your Honor.

On or about

about it looks like March 14th of 2008 and September 26th,
2008 this Individual solicited funds for a pyramid scheme,
the total amount was a, $168,400.
THE JUDGE:

You've heard what's been stated.

Are those the essential facts that you're admitting to to
support the plea?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Yes they are, Your Honor
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ENTRY OF PLEA

1
THE JUDGE:

2

They are.

Okay.

To the charges as

3

contained in Count 1 and Count 2, two Class B misdemeanors,

4

operating a pyramid scheme, what are your pleas?

5

MR. MARK POULSEN:

6

THE JUDGE:

7

Guilty, Your Honor.

I'll receive and accept your guilty

plea and proceed to sentencing at a time that you request.

8

Do you want to be sentenced today or not?

9

MS. 0"BRYANT:

Your Honor, I think we can do

10

everything but the restitution today.

11

stipulated.

12

community service and an appropriate fine for the Class B

13

misdemeanor.

14

days.

15

to the exact amount this individual is able to pay.

16
17

We're recommending that the court order some

And we're asking for a hearing in about 30

We're going to try and come up with a stipulation as

THE JUDGE:

How much community service are you

recommending?

18

MS. 0'BRYANT:

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. MARK POULSEN:

21

THE JUDGE:

22

60 hours.
Is that, is that your understanding?
That will work, Your Honor.

All right.

Anything you'd like to

say in your own behalf, sir?

23

MR. MARK POULSEN:

24

say on his behalf if you don't mind.

25

We've, we've

THE JUDGE:

There's something I'd like to

Go ahead.
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MR. MARK POULSEN:

This individual is an

immigrant from Viet Nam.
THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. MARK POULSEN:

And a, he, although he's not

illiterate he's a, very very unsophisticated.

He was drawn

into an investment scheme by his elders quorum president.
He put all of his assets and life savings into that and a,
lost it all.

He was approached by his, two others about his

a, his deals and told them about it and it resulted in these
charges, Your Honor.
He's an extremely unsophisticated person with no
criminal background and no history whatsoever.

He simply

got caught up in an, in an investment fraud scheme that he
was swept away in and again, lost all of his assets as a
result of it.
I, I would just urge the court's lenience on his
behalf.

A very, again, a very unsophisticated person for

whom the law has just reached up and whacked in the side of
the head.

He doesn't quite understand it all but a, we'll

accept the court's determination on it.
THE JUDGE:

Anything you'd like to say in your own

behalf, sir?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE JUDGE:

If I may.

You may.
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STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT POULSEN

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

For the last 18 months my life

3

have been changed dramatically from this event.

And I don't

4

ask the court to a, to be easy on me.

5

responsibility.

6

do what is right.

7

lost everything we have and we have to start over.

8

same time I teach my children to stand up for and be

9

accountable for the mistake they make.

I believe in

As a father of six children I teach them to
And because of this unfortunate, that

we

At the

And this unfortunate

10

mistake, I went through so much persecute at work and from

11

what people read in the paper and a, of all these things.

12

But the positive outcome came from it, I learned so much from

13

it.

14

have opened from this and I'm grateful for that

15

opportunity.

I became a better father, better husband.

And my eyes

16

And what I'm only asking you as a judge is that

17

my children is everything to me, and that if I can retain

18

my license to continue to work and support them and raise

19

them and start our life over I will greatly appreciate it.

20
21
22
23
24

And I'm sorry for all of this and if you can be
understanding.
THE JUDGE:

Thank you, sir.

Anything further

from anyone?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Nothing, Your Honor.

25
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SENTENCE
THE JUDGE:

All right.

It will be the judgment

and the sentence of the court, Mr. Poulsen, that you serve
six months in the county jail and pay $1,000 fine.

I'll

suspend the sentence this morning, place you on court'probation for 12 months.
live during that time.

Keep the court advised where you

Do not the violate the law.

I'll order you serve 60 hours of community service
and pay a minimum fine of $555 for both, charges, that will
include the 85% surcharge.
255 surcharge is $555.

So it will be a $300 fine and a

Okay?

Is there a court security fee on a Class B
misdemeanor?

I don't know, I don't think so.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Do I understand you it's 500

for both charges?
THE JUDGE:

Total.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Total.

THE JUDGE:

That will include both

Total.

charges.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Okay.

THE JUDGE:

One fine both Counts.

All right.

All right.

Now we need a time

certain since you're on court probation, there were no
probation officer here, when this sentence will be
completed.

So when will he have his 60 hours completed and
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1

pay the fine?

2

with it but I expect it completed within that time period.

3

Okay?

4
5

You tell me and I'll more than likely go along

MS. O'BRYANT:

Your Honor, we still need to set

the restitution—.

6

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

7

MS. O'BRYANT:

—

and I think it's going to

8

probably take the entire 12 months to get everything taken

9

care of.
THE JUDGE:

10
11

Should we just set a, do you have a

number now?
MS. O'BRYANT:

12

Well, we have the total number of

13

restitution.

14

And that's what we wanted to discuss to see if we could come

15

up with a stipulation as to court ordered probation.
THE JUDGE:

16
17

I don't think he has the ability to pay that.

now.

We'll probably put the order right

What is the total number?

18

MS. O'BRYANT:

19

THE JUDGE:

20
21
22

The total number is $168,400, o r —

And you agreed to that, so we don't

need a hearing on that?
MR. MARK POULSEN:
the proper amount.

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MR. MARK POULSEN:

25

No, I don't agree that that's

Okay.
That is the amount that

various people invested, but he didn't get that or any
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1

approaching that so a —
THE JUDGE:

2
3

Well, then that's not the amount that

he should pay if that's your position.

4

MS. 0'BRYANT:

5

not that that is the amount that—

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MS. 0'BRYANT:

8

THE JUDGE:

9

MS. 0'BRYANT:

Right.

It's not a judgment—
—
—

THE JUDGE:

11

MS. O'BRYANT:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

MS. 0'BRYANT:

against him so.

Okay.
What we need to discuss i s —
How much he owes.
—

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

18

THE JUDGE:

time we'll have a hearing.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

21

THE JUDGE:

25

Okay?
Okay.

Now, the 60 hours of community service

and the fine.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

23
24

Okay.

And if it's not decided within that

20

22

We'll put it 60 days down for

the state to submit a claim for restitution.

17

19

what he has the ability to pay.

I—

15
16

he should have to pay.

That's the total loss.

10

14

That's, our position is

Now the fine he can pay within

a week.
THE JUDGE:

One week?

Okay.
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MR. MARK POULSEN:
would say 60 days.

And the community service I

Are you okay with 60 days?

60 days,

months.
THE JUDGE:

That's the order then.

Okay.

Any

questions?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Thank you very much,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Good luck.

Good luck.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH
) SS,
COUNTY OF UTAH

I, Penny C.Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify
that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in
the matter of State vs. Paulsen, hearing date May 11, 2010,
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full,
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered
1 through 11, inclusive, including where it is indicated that
the recording was inaudible.
I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise
associated with any of the parties to this cause of action
and am not interested in the event thereof.
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 5th day of May,
2011.

PENNY • C . /<SteBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY
License (22-102811-7801
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-12

&%£)*$& PENNY C ABBOTT

{£( ®§|ftYsi N0TARy PUBUC * SM7f of UTAH
i°\<EEjff/s
v

*-"

COMMISSION NO. 575806

''*V COMM. EXP. 09/24/2012
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STATE OF UTAH
UT/JrRO'JfiTY

m

b P k- U 5

JEFFREY R. BUHMAN #7041
Utah County Attorney
Mariane 0'Bryant #5442
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Email: ucadm.Dcourt(a).state.ut.us
Phone: (801) 851-8026
Fax:(801)851-8051

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

STATE'S REQUEST FOR
RESTITUTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID POULSEN,
Case No. 101401180
Defendant.
Judge Steven Hansen

Plaintiff, by and through Deputy Utah County Attorney, Mariane O'Bryant, hereby moves
that the court order restitution in this matter in the total amount of $168,400, $82,000 to Robert
Clark and $86,400 to Michael Keith.
This Request is accompanied by the supporting documents.
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day of June, 2010.
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

By: ^ J U

O'/U-

MARIANE O'BRYftNT
Deputy Utah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \ffl-" day of 3UU/\$-- 2010,1 sent a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Request for Restitution to Mark L. Poulsen at 10885 South State Street, Sandy,
Utah 84070.

^ ^ v l^SWJ^

3
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tafjCountp&ttornep
Bureau of Investigations
Jeffrey R. Buhman
Tim Taylor
E. Kent Sundberg
Jeff Robinson

County Attorney
Chief Deputy
Civil Division Chief
Investigation Chief

Patty Johnston
Scott R. Finch
Mark Dell'Ergo
Richard Hales
Doug Witney
Jennifer Nakai
Chelsea Crawford

100 E Center Street, Suite 3300
Provo, Utah 84606
Phone (801) 851-8026
Fax (801) 851-8070

Sergeant
Sergeant
Sergeant
Sergeant
Investigator
Paralegal
Legal Secretary

May 4, 2010

Restitution for the Poulsen case 09CA00035

There are two listed victims in this case. They are Robert Clark from Orem, Utah and Michael
Keith from Mona, Utah. The following list is the outstanding debt/restitution minus the interest
payments received during the period of time these individuals were invested in Money & More.
Victim

Investment

Interest received

Loss for restitution

Robert Clark

$100,000

$18,000

$82,000

Michael Keith

$90,000

$3,600

$86.400
$168,400

Total Restitution

The supporting documents are attached for Robert Clark. Michael Keith didn't provide the
promissory note.

Further information: Robert Clark gave David Poulsen $50,000 for another investment
involving a real estate transaction. The $50, 000 involved in this transaction is NOT included in
the restitution total.

Sgt. Richard C. Hales
Utah County Attorney
Bureau of Investigation
Provo, Utah 84606
801-851-8025
Richh@utah.gov
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PROMISSORY NOTE
Date
PrincQjal Amount: $ /Or,'m ^tTSD
Interest Rate: %% per annum
PROMISE TO PAY.

'

* yp .

/0 \ & &lftte<Jc rof . it 'JQOi J> MJ&>^ (hereinafter "Borrower*) promises to pay
^o^g^^/^n^Qf
(hereinafeer "Lender**), the priiidpal amount of
fiae
li^cLj
Ufg>v-a<J (S fOfifrv* ^togeifaerwifh interest at the rate of .
v^M^-g
(~3 %) per aBMmm on the unpaid p r ^ ^
4 /pn p&O Zfz-— .until paid in full one year later unless renewed.
/

PAYMENT. Borrower will pay the principal amount of this loan annuaUy, upon m ^ ^
investment, with principal and unpaid accrued interest in its entirely. Borrower's final payment will
be for aB principal and interest no^
baas, that is by applying the ration of the actual days outstanding over a year of 365 days, times the
annual interest rate, times the out&anding principal balance. Monthly interest payments will be sent
and postmarked no later than the / c of every month. Borrower will pay Lender at the address shown
below or such otter place as Leader may designate in writing. Unless otherwise agreed, or required
by applicable law, payments will be applied first to accrued interest and the remaining amount to
principal.
PREPAYMENT. Lender agrees to loan the above-referenced funds to Basnrower for a minimum term
of one year. As a result, there will be no prepayment of the loan amount
PJREPATMENT. lender agrees to loan t^
of one year. As a result, there willbe no prepayment cf the loan amount ar interest d^ until
maturity, (If this is the correct option, then we would'need to take out the reference to monthly
interest payments in PAIMENT clause.)
LAIE CHARGE. Borrower's payment will be late if Lender Does notreceiveit within 5 days of the
dae date. If the payment is late, Borrower will be charged a Late Fee of Fifty Dollars ($50).
DEFAULT. If Borrower does not pay this Note as agreed, of if Borrower breaches any other
agreement with Lender, Borrower will be in default
LENDERS RIGHTS. Upon dd£kult,~af ifLender in good faith deems itself unsecured, Lender may
declare the entire unpaid principal balance and accanued interest im^
Borrower* and Borrower will then pay that amount Upcm default, or iftfais Note is not paid at
maturity, Lender, at its option, may increase the interest rate on this note 2.000 percentage points.
The interest rate shall not exceed the maximum rate permitted by applicable law. Leader may pay
someone else to help collect this Note ifBorrower does not pay. Borrower also will pay Lender that:
amount. This includes, subject to any limits under applicable law, Lender's attorneys' fees and legal
expenses whether or not there is a lawsuit, including attorneys srnd legal expenses for bankruptcy
proceedings (including efforts to modify or vacate any automatic stay or injunction), appearances,
and any anticipated post-judgment collection services. Borrower also will pay any court costs. If
there is a lawsuit, Borrower and Lender agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in Utah
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County, State of Utah. This Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah.
GENERAL PROVISIONS. Lender may delay enforcing any of its rights orremediesunder this Note
without losing them. If there is any change in the terms of this Note, and unless otherwise expressly
stated in writing, it is Lender's intention not to rdease any party who signs mis Note, whelher as
maker, acranmnodations maker, orendorser. All such parlies waive notice of any renewals,
extensions, modifications, releases or collateral, and other actions taken by Lender.
Prior to signing this Note, Borrower and Lender read and Borrower and Lender understood all
of the provisions of this Note. Borrower and Lender agree to the terms of the Note and
Borrower and Lender acknowledge receipt of a completed copy of the Note.

BORROWER Signature
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2008-03-14
Posting Date:
Sequence #:
6610239481
Account #:
913447872
Routing Transit: 12400154
$100000.00
Amount #:
000000001054
Check/Serial #:
Bank#:
602
Tran Code:
001054
IRD:
0
P
ItemType:
BOFD:
000000000
Cost Center:
N/A
Teller Number:
N/A
Teller Seq Number: N/A
Processing Date: N/A
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PROMISSORY NOTE
iO

Date

Principal Amount: $
tfOfflO^SD
Interest Rate: i£ft_% per annum.
PROMISEjpPAY.
• •

n\

.

(${B

J^kmJ

BoiAsf u\ rfrt>f>;U f [ IJ C (hereiiiafter "Bonowen promisestopay
cJrml K. (<* ;4-U of tVlt [{Luy X^+ LLCL (hereinafter"Lender"), Aeprincipal amoiniof
ftiniL* 4-Lo^sftifi Jotftr?
(S ^^j^yO ^ )tooetbgru^mtaT^stattberateof
/^> t^-L- ^firl4- ( U& %) per amnn on the unpaid principal balance from
fu?r^r(/' ^ .V
, until paid in full one year later unless renewed.
PAYMENT. Borrower will pay the principal amount of this loan annualiyj upon maturation of the
investment, with principal and unpaid accrued interest in its entirety. Borrower'sfinalpayment will
be for all principal and interest not yet paid Interest wiU be calculated u n ^
basis, tfaatis by applying the ration of the actual days outstanding over a year of 365 days, tiroes the
annual interestrate,times the outstanding principal balance. Monthly interest payments will be seat
and postmarked no later than the ; 5 / o f every month. Borrower will pay Iiendsr at the address shown
bckm* or such other place as Lender may designate in writing. Unless otherwise agreed, or required
by applicable law, payments will be appliedfirstto accrued interest and the remaining amount to
principal.
PREPAYMENT. Ixadbr agreestoloan t ^
of one year. As a result, there will be no prepayment of the loan &moui&.
PIU^AYh-fENT. Lender agrees to
ttfcfncyear.Asaresaihtiherew
maturity, (ffthis isthe correct option, thenwerwavteiIneealio takeom< thz reference to monthly
mk^csipa}mi^itsinPAYMEhTcIai£Sc.)
LAIE CHARGE. Borrower* s paynies&: will be late ifLeader Does not receive it within 5 &x$s of die
due date. If the payment is late, Borrower will be charged aLaleFee of Fifty Dollars ($50).
DEFAULT. If Borrower does not pay thts Note as agEeed, or if Borrower breaches any oti^
agreement with Leader, Borrower will be in default
LENDERS RIGHTS. Upon default, oriflxndermgODdfei^
dedaore the entee unpaid principal balance and accrued interest immediately due, after notice to
Borrower, and Borrower will then pay that angxiot Upondefkilt, or iftf^
maturity, Lender, at its option, may increase the interest rate on this note 2.CKK) percentage points.
The interest rate shall not exceed the sr^dsngm ^gie psmfeied by applicable law. Lcseier may pay
someone elsetohelp collectfinsNote if Borrower does not pay. Bosrowe^ also will pay Lender tiwt
amount This includes, subject to any limits under explicable law, Leaderis attorneys' fees and legal
expenses whether or not there is a kwsui^
I^DC^sEngs (inchkfing eGb«b to modify or vacate any mBtomatfic ^ay or hyuactioQ), appearances,
ami any anticipated post-judgment collection sendees. Borrower a!&
there is a lawsuit. Borrower and Lender agreetosubmittothe jurisdiction^
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County, Stabe ofUtah. This Note shall be governed by and constrn ed in accordance with the laws cf
the State ofUtah.
(ENERAL PROVISIONS. Lender may delay enforcing any of itsrightsorremediesunder thcs Note
whlK>ul losing them_ If the^
and unless otherwise expressly
stated in writing, k is Lender* s intention not toreleaseany party who signs this Note; whether as
maker, accommodations maker, or endorser. All such parties waive notice of any renewals,
extensions, modifications,releasesor collateral, and other actions taken by Lender.
Prior to signing tbb Note, Borrower and Leaderreadand Borrower and Lender understood al
of the proviskMB of tins Note. Borrower and Leader agree to the terms of the Note and
Borrower and Lender acknowledgerccdfrtrfa completed c*py «T the Note.

BORROWER Signature

LENDER Signature
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H U D Hi
4T» DISTRICT CH
STATE OF in"A

1

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT

y^P"

'

mi nkho p -A£\

2
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

'

*-'

3
4
5
6
7

) RESTITUTION HEARING

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

)
)

VS,

CASE
APPEAL

DAVID Q. POULSEN,

101401180
20110292

8
DEFENDANT.

JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN

9
10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on

March 29, 2011.

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

15
16
17

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

18

(From Electronic Recording)

19
20
21

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

22

JUN 2 3 2011

23

ORIGINAL

3omsc<

24
25
PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER
LIC. 102811-7801
abbpeiyahoo.com
Digitized by the Howard W.EMAIL:
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE 1

A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S

2
3

FOR THE STATE:
MARIANE B. O1BRYANT, ESQ.
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
100 EAST CENTER #2100
PROVO UT 84606

4
5
6
FOR DEFENSE:
7

MARK L. POULSEN, ESQ.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 SO. STATE
SANDY UT 84070

8
9
10
11

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE REF

12
13
14

ARGUMENT
BY MS. 0 ' B R Y A N T . . . . . . . . .
BY MR. POULSEN

3,9
4, 10

15
COURT'S ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

16
17

EXHIBIT S-1 BANKRUPTCY DOC

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE 2

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

1

(March 29, 2011)

2
.3

THE JUDGE:

Which case are we ready on?

4

MS. O1BRYANT:

We're ready on David Poulsen,

.5 Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

6
7

"'*"'
Okay.

Number 57, David Poulsen.

We're here for a restitution hearing.
DISCUSSION BY MS. 0'BRYANT

8

MS. O1BRYANT:

9

Your Honor, we have not been able

10

to come to a resolution of this case. But we have agreed

11

rather than have testimony to, to proffer the information to

12

the court.

13

The state filed a restitution request on June 15th

14

of last year.

15

restitution request has the numbers that we would proffer to

16

the court as being the full restitution that the state would

17

request.

It should be in the court's file.

Does the court have that?

18

THE JUDGE:

19

Let me see if I can find that.

20

January 31st.

21
22

MS. 0'BRYANT:

Full and complete restitution?

Right.

The last pleading I have is

And on June, June 15th is

when we filed our original request for restitution.

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MS. 0'BRYANT:

25

And that

Way back.

Okay.

So it's going to be farther in the

file.
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THE JUDGE:
of 168,400.
Keith.

State's request for restitution, total

82,000 to Robert Clark and 86,000 to Michael

Correct?
MS. O'BRYANT:

That's correct, Your Honor.

And

attached to that are the supporting documents for that.
THE JUDGE:
MS. OfBRYANT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
And I believe that the defense

would stipulate that those are the numbers that are related
to this case.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

All right.

Let's hear from

the state, your proffer first and then to defense.

Or you've

already made your proffer s o —
MS. O1BRYANT:

That, that would be our proffer,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

That's your....

Okay.

Okay. Mr. Poulsen?
ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN
MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Your Honor, may I approach?

Yes.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. MARK POULSEN:

I think to be clear,

Your Honor, we would stipulate that the, the dollar figures
that you see there are amounts that victims put into this.
I, I reiterate that there has to be a nexus
between the allegations pled to, which is participating in a
pyramid scheme, and the restitution in this case.
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And I

PAGE 4

don't believe that that 168 represents a nexus in any way, •
shape or form to, to the injury—
THE JUDGE:

That's the argument you made to me

that I denied though, isn't it?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

I'm not sure if that's, if

that's what the basis of your denial was, Your Honor.

I'm

not sure—
THE JUDGE:

That was the basis—

MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

—

—

if that's what you said.

of your case though, wasn't it?

MR. MARK POULSEN:

My request was to dismiss the

hearing.
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

I think the court can still

have a hearing but still make a decision as to the
appropriateness of the relationship.between the a...
We DON'T concede though those victims lost that at
the hands of this person.
support that, Your Honor.

There's no facts in the record to
Any facts would be hearsay to

that effect.
We pled very simply to participating in pyramid
scheme.

I asked the court in all earnest that the

restitution order be tied to only those facts.

Otherwise we

wouldn't have pled to them, Your Honor.
I would say further, had we known that we were
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going to be facing $168,000 restitution I would rather take,
try the case and have the offense, you know, dealt with in a
full and fair hearing than plead to participating in a
pyramid scheme and still face a $168,000 payback.
THE JUDGE:

Well, if he had been found guilty you

would still be faced with the same consequence.

They would

be asking for restitution for this amount.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

They would be, and then, and

again—
THE JUDGE:

We would be right here today whether

you pled guilty or found guilty.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

But we'd probably only do it

to a pyramid scheme, Your Honor.
sticking somebody up for 168,000.

That's different than
They are not the same.

And there's not A nexus between those two, it's very very
crucial.

*
These people all put their money together into a,

pyramid scheme

with, and Mr. Bosch (phonetic) who has been

indicted by the state—
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

So—
They were all victims and lost

on that together.
THE JUDGE:

I don't mean to cut you off.

But I, I

appreciate that argument.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Okay.
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THE JUDGE:

It's a good one and it has some .

persuasive weight to it.

I just decline to adopt it and

disagree.
So we are here today to determine the amount,
you've stipulated to the amount.

If you have something to

say, you'd like to present to me as to what the amount ought
to be for the court.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

Yes I do, Your Honor.

The, the tax statements I have here shows that the
victim, that the, the victim, the, the defendant in the last
two years has had an income of $100,000, 99 and 101 I think
so—
THE JUDGE:

Each year?

MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Each year.

All right.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

That represents a, we're

proffering, Your Honor, that represents his effort to dig
out of the financial hole by working two jobs.

He is an

X-ray technician for Intermountain Health and a, and for
Payson hospital.

And he works two jobs.

And I think it's

between 20 and $25 an hour is what that would net out to
as a wage.

Works, you know, more than a, 70, 80 hours a

week.
He has six children.

One is about to leave to

college, another is about to leave on a mission, various
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stages of high school and junior high and elementary.
He doesn't own a house.
dilapidated cars.

And he owns two old

Lives in an apartment and a, is a...

Again, I would represent to the court that his
expenses are approximately equivalent to his income.

He

pays tithing and his other charitable contributions.

And a,

that again he, he has a, a very little disposable income at
the end of, of that.
He's here in open court, Your Honor, you'd be free
to ask him questions.

This is by proffer and that's what I

would proffer to you.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR. MARK POULSEN:

But that a, I think that

he could realistically do debt service a $10,000 obligation
over a period of, you know, perhaps three years. And a,
that that would be, that's reasonable under the
circumstances.
We're unable to, as the unusual circumstance of
being a, a small Class B misdemeanor with a very large a,
restitution amount in it, theoretically.
But again, I would ask the court to, to not
indenture this person for, for years of his life in paying
back an obligation, which he's already paid, lost $300,000
himself and a, has done everything in his power to support
his family and dig out of the hole that he's in.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE 8

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

; : ;.;

Thank you, Your Honor.

State's response?

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MS. 0' BRYANT
MS. 0!BRYANT:

If I could have just a moment to,

to verify the accuracy.
Your Honor, I don't know if you want this marked as
an exhibit or if I could simply submit this as part of the
restitution.
MR. MARK POULSEN:
MS. O'BRYANT:
marked.

I have no objection.

Okay.

If we could have this

This is from the bankruptcy

filed bankruptcy in 2009.

court.

Mr. Poulsen

It's marked as state's EXHIBIT #1

and they have accepted the accuracy of this.
I would call the court's attention to the average
expenses incurred, monthly income.

There's $1,000 difference

there in the, positive, which would seem to indicate that even
after all of.his monthly expenses he could afford $1,000 a
month payments.
THE JUDGE:

This was dated when?

MS. OfBRYANT:

That's I believe January of

2009.
THE JUDGE:

What are the circumstances now?

MS. OfBRYANT:

My understanding is the total

income that he's making is the same or greater than it was at
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PACT: Q

1

that time.

2

THE JUDGE:

3

Do you want to respond to this?

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. POULSEN

4

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Yes.

My only response,

5

Your Honor, would be that the circumstances of a, of raising

6

a family and paying, the children going to college and those

7

circumstances have, have evaporated whatever additional

8

income might be represented by that, or so-called disposable

9

income.

10
11

Just the needs of a growing family, Your Honor, are

overwhelming in that sense.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

So let's make sure that

12

you're both a, representing to me the standard of review for

13

the court here today.

14

real purpose of the hearing is to determine not the amount of

15

restitution, that's been fixed and is full and complete at

16

the 168,400. Right?

17

ability to pay.

You both stipulate and agree that the

But the order should be based on his

Correct?

18

MS. O1BRYANT:

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. MARK POULSEN:

21

THE JUDGE:

Yes, Your Honor.
Do you agree with that?
I do agree with that.

And what you've presented to me is

22

the only evidence that I have before me to determine his

23

ability to pay.

24
25

Correct?

MR. MARK POULSEN:
appropriateness.

Yes. As well as

If I could state for the record, as well
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as the appropriateness of the payment in the nexus to the
crime is, I believe, a proper standard for the court to
follow.
THE JUDGE:

I'm not quite sure.

You keep arguing

that to me and lym not sure I understand it. Because that
was before me before and I, I think I denied that, that
argument that you have made that there should be a
restitution that, no restitution in this case because it's
not appropriate to the crime that he committed.
MR. MARK POULSEN:

And the only thing again I

would like to say for the record on that point, it's
appropriate to have a restitution hearing where both the
amount of the restitution, or both the ability to pay as
well as the circumstances of the restitution are
appropriate.

I think that that is within the scope of a

restitution hearing.
THE JUDGE:

Ms. Baldwin do you have, 0'Bryant, do

you have anything to respond to that?
MS. OfBRYANT:

Your Honor, I think the court has

ruled on whether restitution is appropriate in the case.
It's just simply the amount that needs to be addressed here
today
COURT'S RULING
THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

Okay.

Well, I have considered that he's working two jobs
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1

and is an X-ray technician, he makes $25 an hour.

2

children.

3

drives old cars.

4

He lives in an apartment.

He has six

He has no home.

He

That he has had income in the past two years of

5

99,000 and $100,000 each year which is substantial income.

6

I do appreciate and find that he has little disposable income

7

but that there was a bankruptcy where he was verifying to the

8

bankruptcy court he had $1,000 a month disposable income back

9

in January of 2009.
I appreciate that his expenses have gone up with

10
11

college and other things towards his family.

12

restitution is an important component in this, in this case.

13

And a, some of the other luxuries of, of college educations

14

and things like that for his children, as important as that

15

is, and I don't mean to diminish that, it seems to me to be

16

a, something that he has the ability to forego, and that the

17

victims in this case should be paid before that takes place.

18

And there's an, obviously that seems to me to be an extra

19

income for him.

But

20

So I think that a restitution order in this case

21

from 168 ought to be a, 60,000, 30,000 to each victim, and

22

that he has the ability to pay $1,000 a month, 500 to each of

23

those victims for five years until that's paid in full.

24

Okay?

25

MR. MARK POULSEN:

Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE JUDGE:

Anything further?

That's the' ' ':'

parameters of what you presented to me.
Is that right, Ms. 0'Bryant?
MS. 0fBRYANT:
-v—

THE JUDGE:

It is correct, Your Honor.
Mr. Poulsen?

Anything else that I'm

missing here that that's what you wanted me to determine
based on the law and the facts that I have before me?
MR. MARK POULSEN:

The defendant was saying he

can't work two jobs for five more years, he just doesn't
think he has the physical capacity for that.
THE JUDGE:

Well he's, he's got a, he's got tax

returns and income of $100,000 a year.

And so I do not see

in any way, shape or form that I have a poverty case before
me here.

And something is going to have to change in his

life-style to make sure that he maybe cuts back on a few
things and that this restitution is paid.
If his income was less than that, counsel, I'd be
more sympathetic with your case.

But that's a substantial

income in this economy, many people are making far less than
that.

So that was the most persuasive piece of evidence in

favor of the state in my view and justified the, especially
in light of the fact that his bankruptcy listed he had
$6,000 a month and $5,000 a month in expenses.
If he has disposable income he wants to place for
his children's college, that's great.

But there are other
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ways to do that, student loans, and children can work.
These victims need to be paid.

I have reduced it

substantially from what was ordered in this case, what was
presented to me I should say in this case, based on his
ability today.

But clearly with the facts before me today

he has that excess income, that income to pay this amount and
for this period of time to these victims.
Thank you.
MR. MARK POULSEN:
THE JUDGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

) SS,
COUNTY OF UTAH

)

I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify
that I received the electronically recorded proceedings in
the matter of State.vs. Poulsen, hearing date March 29, 2011,
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full,
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered
1 through 14, inclusive, including where it is indicated that
the recording was inaudible.
I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise
associated with any of the parties to this cause of action
and am not interested in the event thereof.
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 5th day of May,
2011.

PENNY; C.^AFiBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY
License/l£-102811-7801
Notary Ptlblic, Comm Exp 9-24-12

*?o!?Z

&%m&
(if W^WiXA

PENNY C ABBOTT
0TARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH

N

ViV<gjSflS / ? / COMMISSION NO. 575806

\£~2&

COMM. EXP. 09/24/2012
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Addendum F
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID Q POULSEN,
Defendant,

.

STATE OF UI AH

MINUTES
MTAHC0UN1 1
RESTITUTION HEARING
JUDGMENT, COMMI TME&T
SENTENCE,

21i miW
A
Case No; 101401180
FS
Judge:
STEVEN L. HANSEN
Date:
March 29, 2011

b-ZJvv

PRESENT
Clerk:
taras
Prosecutor: OBRYANT, MARIANE B .
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): POULSEN, MARK L
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 16, 1969
Audio
Tape Number:
11-2 03
Tape Count: 10:47
CHARGES
1. PYRAMID
Plea:
2. PYRAMID
Plea:

SCHEME • Class B Misdemeanor
Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty
SCHEME • Class B Misdemeanor
Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/2010 Guilty

HEARING
TAPE: 11-203
COUNT: 10:47
This matter comes before the court for a restitution'hearing.
Mrs. 0'Bryant proffers testimony. Mr. Poulsen proffers testimony.
Mr. Poulsen stipulates to the dollar;;amounts the victims have
invested. Mrs. OfBryant responds. The court orders restitution in
the amount of $60,000.00.
The court orders $30,000.00 to be paid to Robert Clark and
$30,000.00 to be paid to Michael Keith.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant!s conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME-a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
The total time suspended'for this charge is 180 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of PYRAMID SCHEME a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
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Case No: 101401180 Date:
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1
Fine:
Suspended:
Due:
Fine:
Charge # 2
Suspended:
Due:
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

Mar 29, 2011

$1000.00
$10 00.00
$0.00
$1000.00
$10 00.00
$0.00
$2000.00
$2000.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest

COMMUNITY SERVICE
Complete 60 hour(s) of community service.
Restitution
Amount: $30000.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: ROBERT CLARK
Restitution
Amount:.$30000.00
Pay in behalf of: MICHAEL KEITH
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are on timepay 101401180.
The defendant is to pay $1000.00 monthly on the 29th.
The number of payments scheduled is 63 plus a final payment of
$748.75.
The first payment is due on 4/29/2011 the final payment of $748.75
is due on 07/29/2016. The final paymentS3*
m ^ vary based on
,/
interest
4*.
--<•-" «*&
say,.
- * %
" v +*'•
Date:

5-^oi-u
MSMS^fi*
STEVEN L . HANSEN §j§£
Court
JudaSl
i
M
i
i M l g lm
^
D i s t r i c t C o u r t JudgSI
o
STAMP USED AT DIRECT*
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